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Abstract
Bayesian epistemology tells us with great precision how we should move from
prior to posterior beliefs in light of new evidence or information, but says little
about where our prior beliefs come from. It o¤ers few resources to describe some
prior beliefs as rational or well-justied, and others as irrational or unreasonable.
A di¤erent strand of epistemology takes the central epistemological question to
be not how to change ones beliefs in light of new evidence, but what reasons
justify a given set of beliefs in the rst place. We o¤er an account of rational belief
formation that closes some of the gap between Bayesianism and its reason-based
alternative, formalizing the idea that an agent can have reasons for his or her
(prior) beliefs, in addition to evidence or information in the ordinary Bayesian
sense. Our analysis of reasons for belief is part of a larger programme of research
on the role of reasons in rational agency (Dietrich and List 2012a,b).
Keywords: Bayesian epistemology, doxastic reasons, prior and posterior beliefs,
principle of insu¢ cient reason, belief formation, belief change
1 Introduction
Bayesian epistemology tells us how we should change our beliefs in light of new
evidence or information. It species what the impact of any given item of evidence
or information should be on our beliefs, and what posterior beliefs we should arrive
at after receiving such evidence or information (for an introduction, see, e.g., Bovens
and Hartmann 2003). This picture of rational belief updating assumes, however,
that we have started out with some prior beliefs, and one of Bayesianisms most
widely recognized shortcomings is that it does not say anything about where those
priors come from. Bayesianism by itself does not o¤er the resources to endorse some
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at a number of occasions, including a seminar at the
CUNY Graduate Center, 5/2010, and the Choice Group workshop on Reasons and Rational Choice,
LSE, 2/2011. A related talk was given at the 2010 Synthese Conference, Columbia University, 4/2010.
We are grateful to the participants, and especially Horacio Arló-Costa, Rohit Parikh, and Wlodek
Rabinowicz, for helpful comments and discussion.
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prior beliefs as rational or appropriate, and to criticize others as irrational or at
least unreasonable. Yet, we intuitively think of some prior beliefs as more reasonable
than others. We tend to consider conspiracy theories, for example, less credible than
more ordinary explanations of the same phenomena, even if we do not have enough
evidence to rule them out in advance. In consequence, we tend to regard someone
who assigns high prior probabilities to far-fetched theories as less reasonable than
someone who assigns lower (albeit non-zero) probabilities to them. Nonetheless, a
conspiracy theorist may be impeccably rational from a purely Bayesian perspective.
Of course, there are proposals on how to distinguish good Bayesian priors from
bad ones  the former are sometimes required to maximize entropy, for example
but these stipulations often seem rather ad hoc and do not generally groundan
agents beliefs in a philosophically compelling manner. Thus Bayesian epistemology
still lacks an established account of the formation of prior beliefs.
A very di¤erent but increasingly popular strand of epistemology takes the central
epistemological question to be not how an agent should rationally move from his or
her prior beliefs to his or her posterior ones, but what reasons justify a given set
of beliefs in the rst place. The focus of this approach is not on the constraints
governing the relationship between prior and posterior beliefs, but on the way beliefs
can be grounded or anchored in certain underlying reasons. A key feature of a
rational belief, on this picture, is that it is held for the right reasons, or at least for
what the agent takes to be the right reasons. Reasons for belief are not the same
as evidence or information, but they are, in some sense, more fundamental (on the
distinction between evidence and reasons for belief, see, e.g., Foley 1991). This raises
the question of what such reasons are, and below we propose a denition. Crucially,
the notion of a reason for belief is absent from Bayesian epistemology.
The aim of this paper is to o¤er a new account of rational belief formation that
closes some of the gap between Bayesian epistemology and its reason-based alterna-
tive. We formalize the idea that an agent can have reasons for his or her (prior)
beliefs, in addition to the agents evidence or information in the ordinary Bayesian
sense. Our analysis of reasons for belief is part of a larger programme of research on
the role of reasons in rational agency, and we have o¤ered an analysis of reasons for
preference and action elsewhere (Dietrich and List 2012a,b).1 The formal concepts
and results presented in this paper draw on that earlier work.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 1, we introduce the way we think
about beliefs and belief formation, distinguishing between ordinal and cardinal kinds
of belief. In Section 2, we dene the notion of a doxastic reason (a reason for belief)
and discuss what it means for a proposition to become a doxastic reason for an agent.
In Section 3, we state our rst main representation theorem, which applies to ordinal
1Other related works on reasons for preferences include von Wright (1963), Liu (2010), and Osh-
erson and Weinstein (2012).
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beliefs, formally represented by credence orders over di¤erent epistemic possibilities.
This result, which is an interpretationally new variant of an earlier theorem (Dietrich
and List 2012a,b), shows that if two simple axioms are satised, an agents beliefs
across variations in his or her doxastic reasons can be represented in terms of a single
underlying binary relation, which we call a credibility relation. This relation ranks
di¤erent combinations of doxastic reasons in an order of credibility, which can be
interpreted positively or normatively. Under a positive interpretation, it captures how
strongly the agent is disposed to believe the various epistemic possibilities picked out
by the di¤erent combinations of doxastic reasons. Under a normative interpretation,
it captures how strongly the agent ought rationally to believe these possibilities.
In Sections 4 and 5, we give some examples and draw attention to the surprising
possibility of an intransitive credibility relation in the presence of fully consistent
beliefs. In Section 6, we turn to the case of cardinal beliefs, formally represented by
credence functions, and state our second main theorem, which provides a reason-based
representation of an agents cardinal beliefs. In Section 7, we briey address a possible
objection and reinforce our claim that reason-based belief formation cannot easily be
redescribed in standard Bayesian terms. In Section 8, we make some concluding
remarks.
2 Beliefs and belief formation
We consider an agents beliefs in some set X of epistemic possibilities. These possibil-
ities can take a number of forms, depending on the context in which we wish to apply
our framework. They can be possible worlds or states of the world, or alternative
theories or hypotheses. All we assume is that the elements of X (i) are mutually
exclusive and (ii) jointly exhaust the relevant possibilities.
A subset of X is called a proposition. It is said to be true of those possibilities
contained in it, and false of all other possibilities. This terminology should be familiar
in the case in which X is the set of all relevant possible worlds. While the standard
denition of a proposition is extensional (identifying any proposition with the subset
of X it picks out), it is often useful to model propositions as intensional objects,
representing them for instance by sentences from a suitable language, and in a number
of places below we implicitly do so.
In Bayesian epistemology, the agents beliefs are usually represented by a credence
function (subjective probability function) onX, which assigns to each possibility inX
a real number between 0 and 1, with a sum-total of 1. To keep things simple, however,
we begin by representing an agents beliefs in an ordinal rather than cardinal way.
So we represent the agents beliefs by a credence order %, a complete and transitive
binary relation on X. For any two possibilities x and y, x % y means that the agent
believes x at least as strongly as y; or, in the language of degrees of belief, the agents
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degree of belief in x is greater than or equal to his or her degree of belief in y. We
further write x  y if x % y but not y % x (the agent believes x more strongly than
y), and x  y if x % y and y % x (the agent believes x and y equally strongly). Later
we return to the more standard representation of beliefs by credence functions.
Bayesian epistemology gives an account of how an agents beliefs should rationally
change in response to certain evidence or information. Suppose, for example, the
agent receives some evidence that rules out some of the possibilities in X. He or she
must then change his or her credence order in such a way as to rank any possibilities
ruled out by the evidence below (or at least weakly below) any possibilities not ruled
out, while not changing any other rankings. This is a form of Bayesian updating.
Here, however, we want to focus on how the agent arrives at his or her beliefs in
the possibilities in X in the rst place, before receiving any evidence that rules out
certain possibilities. We call this the problem of belief formation. We can look at this
problem from both positive and normative perspectives, i.e., we can ask either how
an agent actually forms his or her beliefs, or how he or she ought rationally to do so.
It is at this point that reasons come into play.
3 Reasons for belief
Reasons can be conceptualized in a number of ways. Some philosophers think of rea-
sons as facts of a certain kind; others as certain kinds of properties of the possibilities
under consideration; still others as mental states of the agent. Thomas Scanlon (1998,
p. 67) denes a reason as a consideration that counts in favor of some judgment-
sensitive attitude [e.g., belief or preference]. We prefer to adopt a slightly more
general denition, preserving the counting aspect, but dropping the in favor of
aspect of Scanlons denition. Thus, we think of a reason as a consideration more
precisely, a proposition  that has a particular kind of relevance (that counts) in
relation to an agents intentional attitudes, but where the relevance in question (the
relevant kind of counting) can be spelt out in a variety of ways. It need not be as
simple as counting in favor ofor againstsomething. The force of a particular rea-
son might depend, for example, on which other reasons are present. We here focus on
reasons for belief, rather than reasons for preference or action. We call such reasons
doxastic reasons.
Since we want to develop a framework that can be interpreted positively as well as
normatively, we further distinguish between positive and normative doxastic reasons.
A positive doxastic reason is a proposition that is relevant for the agents actual
beliefs: it may a¤ect the agents actual belief in any possibility of which it is true
vis-à-vis other possibilities. A normative doxastic reason, by contrast, is a proposition
that is relevant for the beliefs the agent ought rationally to have: it may constrain
the belief the agent ought to have in any possibility of which it is true vis-à-vis other
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possibilities. Our denition scheme leaves open how a proposition must a¤ect or
constrain the agents actual or ideally rational beliefs to count as a doxastic reason of
one of these kinds. This may depend on factors such as the context and which other
doxastic reasons are present. Our formal results below allow us to say more about
these dependencies.
To illustrate the notions of positive and normative doxastic reasons, suppose the
elements of X are scientic hypotheses. If a scientist has a high degree of belief in
a particular hypothesis because of its elegance, the proposition that the hypothesis
is elegant is a positive doxastic reason for the scientists belief. This proposition is
relevant for the scientists actual beliefs, insofar as it a¤ects the belief he actually has
with respect to the given hypothesis, of which the proposition is true. If the scientist
has a high degree of belief in a particular hypothesis despite its inconsistency, the
proposition that the hypothesis is inconsistent is a normative doxastic reason for him
not to believe it so strongly, contrary to his actual belief. This proposition is relevant
for the beliefs he ought rationally to have: he ought to have a low degree of belief
in any hypothesis of which the proposition is true (i.e., any inconsistent hypothesis),
even though he does not actually do so.
Let D denote the set of doxastic reasons for the agents beliefs regarding X in a
given context or doxastic state. Depending on the intended interpretation, the reasons
in D can be either positive or normative. Thus the set D contains all the propositions
that are relevant for the agents beliefs in the appropriate sense: either positively or
normatively. The set D need not be, and often will not be, consistent. Di¤erent
doxastic reasons may be true of di¤erent possibilities in X and may therefore pull
the agents beliefs in di¤erent directions. Our aim is to analyze the interplay between
di¤erent doxastic reasons.
To mark the fact that the agents beliefs depend on his or her set of doxastic
reasons, we append the subscript D to the symbol %, interpreting %D as the agents
(actual or ideally rational) credence order in the event that D is his or her set of
doxastic reasons in relation to the possibilities in X. Our analysis focuses on how %D
depends onD. From a positive perspective, the dependency of interest is that between
the agents set of positive doxastic reasons (represented by D under the positive
interpretation) and the beliefs he or she actually has (represented by %D under the
positive interpretation). From a normative perspective, it is the dependency between
the agents set of normative doxastic reasons (represented by D under the normative
interpretation) and the beliefs he or she ought rationally to have (represented by %D
under the normative interpretation). In line with our earlier notation, we write D to
represent the strict order corresponding to %D, and D to represent the equivalence
relation.
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4 When does a proposition become a doxastic reason?
Not every proposition pertaining to the possibilities in X will be a doxastic reason
for the agents beliefs in a given context or doxastic state. As a matter of posi-
tive fact, only some propositions will be su¢ ciently salient for the agent to play the
role of doxastic reasons for his or her beliefs. Which propositions do so in any given
situation is a contingent psychological matter, which cannot be settled a priori.2 Nor-
matively, moreover, only some propositions are epistemically relevant for the agents
beliefs. Di¤erent epistemological theories give di¤erent answers to the question of
which propositions they are. For example, is the fact that a particular scientic hy-
pothesis is parsimonious or elegant a normative reason to believe the hypothesis? Is
the fact that a particular scenario is psychologically salient also a normative reason
to consider that scenario credible? Is a theory that has the hallmarks of a conspiracy
theory less likely to be true? Di¤erent epistemological theories give di¤erent answers
to such questions.
Furthermore, positive and normative doxastic reasons can be quite distinct from
one another. We know from epistemology that agents sometimes form their beliefs on
the basis of considerations positive doxastic reasons that are by no means norma-
tive reasons for those beliefs. Someone may believe something because it appeals to
him or her in ways that are completely irrelevant from the perspective of a normative
theory of epistemology.
To provide a model of a doxastic agent in actual as well as counterfactual circum-
stances, we must take the agent to have an entire family of credence orders, consisting
of one credence order %D for each possible set of doxastic reasons D. Although at
any given time the agent will be in a single doxastic state, the reference to a family
of credence orders expresses the fact that the agent may be disposed or, under the
normative interpretation, rationally required to change his or her beliefs in certain
ways when D changes.
To dene this family of credence orders, we need to say what the di¤erent possible
doxastic states of the agent are. Let D denote the set of all sets of doxastic reasons
deemed possible: psychologically possible under a positive interpretation, normatively
2 In our earlier work on reasons for preferences, we discuss three accounts of when a proposition
becomes positively relevant (see Dietrich and List 2012a). The rst is the abstract conceptual-
ization account, according to which a proposition attains positive relevance as soon as the agent
conceptualizes it abstractly. We nd this account insu¢ cient. The second account is the qualitative
understandingaccount, according to which a proposition attains positive relevance only if in addition
to being conceptualized by the agent it is also understood in a more demanding qualitative sense.
We take this account to be more plausible than the rst one, at least in some applications. The
third account is the attentional salienceaccount, according to which a proposition gains positive
relevance if and only if it is su¢ ciently salient for the agent or the agent explicitly attends to it.
Arguably, this account best captures the role deliberation may play in inuencing an agents reasons
for his or her attitudes.
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admissible under a normative one. Each set D in D corresponds to one particular
context or doxastic state the agent could possibly (or admissibly) be in. In the limit,
D could be the set of all logically possible sets of propositions. However, for our rst
theorem, we only assume that D is intersection-closed, i.e.,
for any D1; D2 2 D, D1 \D2 2 D.
For our second theorem, we only assume that D is either intersection-closed, as just
dened, or union-closed, meaning that
for any D1; D2 2 D, D1 [D2 2 D.
In fact, in the last clause, union-closure can even be weakened to the requirement
that, for any pair of sets D1; D2 2 D, D contain some superset of D1 [D2.
5 A reason-based representation of ordinal beliefs
We can now state our two central axioms on the relationship between an agents
set of doxastic reasons and his or her beliefs. They are the doxastic counterparts of
two axioms on the relationship between practical reasons and preferences we have
introduced elsewhere (Dietrich and List 2012a,b). We rst state these axioms in
relation to ordinal beliefs, i.e., beliefs represented by credence orders, and later restate
them in the more standard, cardinal case of beliefs represented by credence functions.
Both axioms capture the idea that an agents beliefs in the possibilities in X are
constrained by the propositions that (i) characterize those possibilities and (ii) serve
as doxastic reasons for the agent. Depending on whether we interpret our framework
positively or normatively, the constraints either describe the agents actual belief
formation or specify how he or she ought rationally to form his or her beliefs.
The rst axiom says that the agent has an equal degree of belief in any two
possibilities of which the same doxastic reasons are true.
Axiom 1 (Principle of insu¢ cient reason) For any x; y 2 X and any D 2 D,
fR 2 D : R is true of xg = fR 2 D : R is true of yg =) x D y:
This axiom expresses, and perhaps generalizes, the idea underlying the well-known
principle of insu¢ cient reason, which goes back at least to Bernoulli (1654-1705) and
Laplace (1749-1827). In its traditional form, the principle states that unless we have
su¢ cient reason to distinguish between two possibilities over and above distinguishing
them by name, we should consider them equiprobable. Our present variant formalizes
the lack of su¢ cient reason as the absence of any doxastic reasons that discriminate
between the possibilities in question.
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The second axiom says that if the agents set of doxastic reasons grows (say from
D to D0) but none of the added reasons (in D0nD) is true of either of a given pair of
possibilities x and y, then the agents credal ranking of x and y remains unchanged.
Axiom 2 (Invariance of relative likelihoods under the addition of irrele-
vant reasons) For any x; y 2 X and any D;D0 2 D with D0  D,
no R 2 D0nD is true of x or y =) [x %D y , x %D0 y] :
Axiom 2 is plausible since we do not expect an agent to change his or her credal
ranking of x and y unless he or she has come to focus on at least one new doxastic
reason that is true of x or y and is thereby relevant. Without any such new reason,
the agent has no su¢ cient reason for changing his or her belief in x relative to y.
By reinterpreting a theorem originally proved in the context of reason-based pref-
erences (Dietrich and List 2012a,b), we can show that the two axioms just introduced
are necessary and su¢ cient for a parsimonious representation of the agents beliefs.
The agents credence orders across all variations in doxastic reasons can then be
represented in terms of a single underlying binary relation, denoted , which ranks
di¤erent possible combinations of doxastic reasons in terms of how crediblethey are.
We call this relation a credibility relation. A possible combination of doxastic reasons
the relatum on both sides of  is a consistent subset of some underlying set P of
all possible doxastic reasons.3 (As is standard, a set of propositions is consistent if
there is a possibility x in X of which all the propositions in the set are true.)
Theorem 1 The agents family of credence orders (%D)D2D satises Axioms 1 and
2 if and only if there exists a credibility relation  over all possible combinations of
doxastic reasons such that, for each D 2 D,
x%D y , fR2D : R is true of xgfR2D : R is true of yg for all x; y 2 X.
According to this representation, the agents credibility relation generates the
agents beliefs as follows: in any doxastic state, the agent believes a possibility x
more strongly than another possibility y if and only if the credibility relation ranks
the combination of doxastic reasons that are true of x above the combination of
doxastic reasons that are true of y. The two combinations of doxastic reasons that
are being compared (i.e., fR2D : R is true of xg and fR2D : R is true of yg) can be
seen as characterizing the possibilities x and y through the lens of the agents doxastic
state.
3We might dene P, for instance, as the set of all those propositions that occur in at least one
specication of D in D.
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6 Two examples
Some examples help to illustrate this reason-based representation of an agents beliefs.
Suppose an agent seeks to form beliefs regarding four simple possibilities, namely
possible states of a particular refrigerator:4
The pump (of the refrigerator) is broken and the ice (inside) is melting (bm).
The pump is not broken but the ice is melting nonetheless (:bm).
The pump is broken but (surprisingly) the ice is not melting (b:m).
The pump is not broken and the ice is not melting (:b:m).
Suppose, further, the agent has not yet gathered any evidence about this particular
refrigerator but instead seeks to form his or her prior beliefs on the basis of the
antecedent credibility of the di¤erent possibilities (this antecedent credibility may of
course depend on the agents background beliefs about the world). For simplicity,
suppose the only considerations (propositions) that may serve as reasons for the
agents prior beliefs are
B : the pump is broken (formally fbm; b:mg), and
M : the ice is melting (formally fbm;:bmg),
and any set of these reasons can be simultaneously active, i.e., D consists of all
subsets of P =fB;Mg. Now it is conceivable that the agents credence orders across
variations in his or her doxastic reasons are the following:
D = fB;Mg : :b:m  D bm D :bm D :b:m;
D = fBg : :b:m  D :bm D bm D b:m;
D = fMg : :b:m  D b:m D bm D :bm;
D = ? : :b:m  D bm D :bm D :b:m:
This family of credence orders is to be understood as follows: if the agent has or
focuses on both B and M as his or her doxastic reasons, then the agents credence
order over the four possibilities is the rst one; if the agent has or focuses on B
alone as his or her doxastic reason, then the agents credence order is the second one;
and so on. It is important to note that this is just one example of what the agents
credence orders in the four di¤erent possible doxastic states might look like (note, in
particular, that the agents set of doxastic reasons only constrains but does not by
itself determine the corresponding credence order; it does so only in conjunction with
the underlying credibility relation).
One can check that the present family of credence orders satises Axioms 1 and
2. According to our theorem, it must then be representable in terms of a single
4This example is inspired by a freezerexample given by Skorupski (1997).
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underlying credibility relation. What is this relation? It is easy to see that it must
satisfy
? > fB;Mg > fMg > fBg;
where > denotes the strict relation induced by . Thus the empty reason combina-
tion, representing the default in which the pump is not broken and the ice is not
melting, is deemed most credible; the combination fB;Mg, in which the pump is
broken and the ice is melting, is deemed second most credible; the combination fMg,
in which the ice is melting without a broken pump as an accompanying reason, is
deemed second least credible; and the combination fBg, in which the pump is broken
without being accompaniedby melting ice, is deemed least credible. Consistently
with our ordinary practices of belief formation, this credibility relation will then be
reected in the agents (prior) credence order over the four possible states of the
refrigerator, capturing the agents assignment of (prior) probabilities to these states.
A second example is also in line with how we ordinarily form our beliefs in the
absence of specic evidence. The example resonates with the economic literature on
salience and focal points in rational decision making (for a classic contribution,
see Schelling 1960). Suppose one of us, say Christian, has agreed to meet his friend
Rohit somewhere in Washington DC at 12 noon tomorrow, but the two of them have
not agreed on a specic place, and they have no way to communicate. Moreover,
Christian has no further evidence as to where Rohit is likely to expect him; he has
never met up with Rohit in Washington before and does not even know how well
Rohit knows Washington. Here are some possible meeting points:
Union Station (u);
Lincoln Memorial (l);
White House (w);
Hilary Clintons apartment (h).
How will, or alternatively should, Christian form his beliefs on where Rohit might
expect him? The following are possible considerations that might serve as doxastic
reasons in his belief formation process:
A : The place in question is where one arrives in Washington (formally fug).
F : The place in question is world-famous (formally fl; wg).
R : The place in question has restricted access (formally fw; hg).
So Union Square is the only relevant place where one arrives in Washington; both the
Lincoln Memorial and the White House are world-famous; and both the White House
and Hilary Clintons apartment have restricted access due to security arrangements.
Suppose, further, that any set of these reasons constitutes a possible doxastic state. In
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particular, Christians credence orders across variations in his set of doxastic reasons
could look like this:
D = fA;F;Rg : u D l D w D h;
D = fA;Fg : u D l D w D h;
D = fA;Rg : u D l D w D h;
D = fF;Rg : l D w D u D h;
D = fAg : u D l D w D h;
D = fFg : l D w D u D h;
D = fRg : l D u D w D h;
D = ? : l D u D w D h:
Again, this is just one example of what the family of credence orders across variations
in the agents doxastic state might look like. As in the earlier example, it is easy to
check that the present family of credence orders satises Axioms 1 and 2. So what is
the underlying credibility relation? It must satisfy:
fAg > fFg > fF;Rg > ? > fRg.
Thus the reason combination fAg is considered most credible, the combination fFg
second most credible, the combination fF;Rg third most credible, the empty com-
bination second least credible, and the combination fRg least credible. Accordingly,
Christian will believe it to be antecedently much more credible that Rohit will meet
him in a place where one arrives in Washington DC than, for instance, in Hilary Clin-
tons apartment, of which the only salient thing to be said is that it has restricted
access. Again, the kind of reasoning captured by this example can be seen as a stylized
version of the way doxastic reasons feature in our ordinary belief formation.
It should be clear at this point how our reason-based representation of an agents
ordinal beliefs works. But we should take a closer look at the nature of the agents
credibility relation that is guaranteed by this representation.
7 Is the credibility relation transitive?
While we have assumed that the agents credence order in any doxastic state is tran-
sitive, this does not settle the question of whether this property carries over to the
underlying credibility relation. Surprisingly, the assumptions introduced so far are
insu¢ cient to ensure a transitive credibility relation. We show this by giving an ex-
ample structurally equivalent to an example we have given in the context of reasons
for preferences (Dietrich and List 2012a).
Suppose a scientist seeks to rank three alternative hypotheses, h1, h2 and h3, in
an order of prior probability. For simplicity, let us assume that the hypotheses can
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be assessed with respect to three di¤erent properties: whether they are
P : parsimonious,
C : coherent with other theoretical assumptions, and
W : explanatorily wide-ranging.
Crucially, each hypothesis exhibits only two of the three virtues: h1 fails to be ex-
planatorily wide-ranging, h2 fails to be coherent with other theoretical assumptions,
and h3 fails to be parsimonious, as summarized in the following table:
P C W
h1 true true false
h2 true false true
h3 false true true
Now the scientists (prior) credence order over the three hypotheses depends on which
of the three virtues serve as doxastic reasons in his or her belief formation. It is
conceivable, for example, that his or her beliefs across variations in doxastic reasons
are as follows:
D = fP;C;Rg : h1 D h2 D h3;
D = fP;Cg : h1 D h2 D h3; (1)
D = fC;Wg : h3 D h1 D h2; (2)
D = fP;Wg : h2 D h3 D h1; (3)
D = fPg : h2 D h1 D h3;
D = fCg : h3 D h1 D h2;
D = fWg : h3 D h2 D h1;
D = ? : h1 D h2 D h3:
This family of credence orders can be shown to satisfy Axioms 1 and 2. So there
must exist an underlying credibility relation that can generate all of these credence
orders. Surprisingly, however, this credibility relation fails to be transitive. To see
this, consider the rows labelled (1), (2) and (3), which display the scientists credence
orders when his or her set of doxastic reasons is one of fP;Cg, fC;Wg or fP;Wg.
To represent the scientists beliefs in the doxastic states corresponding to these rows,
his or her credibility relation must have the following properties:
fP;Cg > fPg > fCg;
fC;Wg > fCg > fWg;
fP;Wg > fWg > fPg;
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and so the relation must be intransitive: fPg is deemed more credible than fCg, fCg
more credible than fWg, and yet fWg more credible than fPg, a cyclical sequence
of binary comparisons.
Interestingly, this intransitivity in the scientists credibility relation goes along
with the scientists having a perfectly transitive credence order in any given doxastic
state: for any set D of doxastic reasons, the corresponding credence order %D is a
perfectly transitive relation, as we have seen. So, if the scientist is always in a stable
doxastic state, the intransitivity in the underlying credibility relation will never show
up in his or her actual beliefs.
But the intransitivity can come to the surface if di¤erent contexts somehow ac-
tivatedi¤erent sets of doxastic reasons. Imagine, for example, that the comparison
of any two hypotheses makes precisely those doxastic reasons salient that distinguish
these hypotheses. So, in a comparison between h1 and h2, the scientists doxastic
reasons will be C and W ; in a comparison between h2 and h3, they will be P and C;
and in a comparison between h1 and h3, they will be P and W . With these shifts in
doxastic reasons across di¤erent pairwise comparisons, the scientist will consider h1
more credible than h2, h2 more credible than h3, and yet h3 more credible than h1,
despite having perfectly consistent beliefs relative to any xed set of doxastic reasons.
On the other hand, we can also nd conditions under which an intransitive cred-
ibility relation is ruled out, so that the patterns of belief just discussed can never
occur. In particular, the identied intransitivity could never occur if there existed
additional hypotheses h4 to h7 of which precisely one or none of the three possible
doxastic reasons, P , C and W , were true. Then the scientists credence order over
the extended set of hypotheses h1 to h7 in the doxastic state D = fP;C;Wg would
constrain his or her credibility relation to rank all possible combinations of reasons,
including the three singletons fPg, fCg and fWg, transitively.
As we have observed elsewhere (Dietrich and List 2012a), this counterfactual stip-
ulation would give the scientist a kind of Olympian perspectivefrom which he or she
could (i) identify one possibility in X corresponding to each possible combination of
doxastic reasons (which instantiates all and only the reasons in it) and (ii) by ranking
these possibilities, rank all the corresponding reason combinations transitively.
A more technical result generalizes this observation. If the set of possible sets
of doxastic reasons D is union-closed and the underlying set P of possible doxastic
reasons is weakly independent meaning that, for every consistent subset S  P
there exists some possibility x 2 X of which, among the possible reasons in P, all
and only those reasons in S are true  then the credibility relation will always be
transitive; i.e., it will be a credibility order not just some relation over all possible
combinations of doxastic reasons (for a proof, see Dietrich and List 2012a).
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8 A reason-based representation of cardinal beliefs
We can now go beyond the representation of beliefs in terms of credence orders and
consider the more standard representation in terms of credence functions (subjective
probability functions). The agents beliefs are thus represented by a credence function
C from the set of possibilities X into the interval from 0 and 1, with a sum-total of
1.5 The credence of any proposition (a subset of X) is dened in the usual way by
adding up the credences of all the possibilities of which the proposition is true.
To indicate that the agents beliefs depend once again on his or her doxastic
reasons, we append the subscript D to C, interpreting CD as the agents (actual
or ideally rational) credence function when D is his or her set of doxastic reasons
in relation to the possibilities in X. We are interested in how CD depends on D,
quantifying, as before, over all possible sets of doxastic reasons in D. So the object
under investigation is now a family of credence functions (CD)D2D rather than a
family of credence orders (%D)D2D.
The cardinal variants of our two axioms on the relationship between the agents
doxastic reasons and his or her beliefs are directly analogous to the earlier ordinal
variants. Again, the constraints given by the axioms can be interpreted either as
characterizing the agents actual belief formation or as specifying how he or she ought
rationally to form his or her beliefs. Apart from substituting a credence function for
a credence order, the rst axiom is identical to the earlier one, requiring the agent
to have an equal degree of belief in any two possibilities of which the same doxastic
reasons are true.
Axiom 1* (Principle of insu¢ cient reason) For any x; y 2 X and any D 2 D,
fR 2 D : R is true of xg = fR 2 D : R is true of yg =) CD(x) = CD(y):
The second axiom is also essentially the same as its earlier counterpart, except
that it is in one respect more specic. Recall that the earlier second axiom required
that if the agents set of doxastic reasons grows from D to D0 but none of the added
reasons in D0nD is true of either of a given pair of possibilities x and y, then the
agents subjective likelihood of x relative to y remains unchanged. In the ordinal
case, this simply meant that x %D y , x %D0 y. In the cardinal case, we have to be
more specic in saying what it means for the relative likelihood of x and y to remain
unchanged for the agent. Here we require the agents subjective likelihood ratio of
x and y to remain unchanged, i.e., we replace the clause x %D y , x %D0 y with
CD(x)
CD(y)
=
CD0 (x)
CD0 (y)
. Thus the second axiom becomes the following:
5To avoid technicalities, we assume that X is countable and that each x in X is assigned non-zero
probability.
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Axiom 2* (Invariance of relative likelihoods under the addition of irrele-
vant reasons) For any x; y 2 X and any D;D0 2 D with D0  D,

no R 2 D0nD is true of x or y =) CD(x)
CD(y)
=
CD0(x)
CD0(y)
for any x 2 X.
What is the consequence of Axioms 1* and 2*? It should be evident that an
underlying credibility order is not su¢ cient to encode the information needed to
represent a family of (cardinal) credence functions (CD)D2D. Instead, the agents
beliefs are now representable in terms of an underlying real-valued credibility function
(as distinct from credence function), denoted , which encodes cardinal credibility
assessments over possible combinations of doxastic reasons.
Theorem 2 The agents family of credence functions (CD)D2D satises Axioms 1*
and 2* if and only if there exists a real-valued credibility function  over all possible
combinations of doxastic reasons such that, for each D 2 D,
CD(x) =
(fR2E:R is true of xg)P
x02X
(fR2E:R is true of x0g) .
According to this cardinal representation, the agents credibility function gener-
ates the agents beliefs as follows: in any doxastic state, the degree of belief the agent
assigns to any possibility is proportional to the credibility (according to ) of the set
of doxastic reasons that are true of that possibility. The factor of proportionality,
1=
P
x02X
(fR 2 E:R is true of x0g), depends on the doxastic state D and ensures that
the agents degrees of belief across all possibilities x in X add up to 1.
Restricted to the relevant combinations of doxastic reasons  those needed to
generate the agents beliefs  the credibility function  is unique up to a positive
multiplicative constant. The function is fully unique (on the relevant domain) if we
introduce the convention that  adds up to 1, meaning that the credibility function has
the formal properties of a probability function over the set of all possible combinations
of doxastic reasons.
9 A possible objection
Before concluding with some more general reections, we need to address one possible
objection. Can the kind of reason-based belief formation we have discussed not simply
be remodelled in ordinary Bayesian terms? In other words, could it not simply be
the case that the agent forms his or her beliefs in doxastic state D by ordinary
Bayesian updating instead of some reason-based process? He or she would start with
uniform Bayesian priors across the possibilities in X, take into account some relevant
information, which is functionally equivalent to our set of doxastic reasons D, and
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perform a Bayesian update that results in a posterior credence (subjective probability)
function identical to CD.
The reply is simple. Recall the example of meeting a friend in Washington DC.
Our theory allows the agent, for instance, to arrive at a credence function of the form:
CD(u) = 0:49;
CD(l) = 0:3;
CD(w) = 0:2;
CD(n) = 0:01;
where u, l, w, and n are the four possible meeeting points, as before. These beliefs
make perfect sense when the agents set of doxastic reasons includes all three con-
siderations we have mentioned: where one arrives in Washington, whether the place
in question is famous, and whether there is restricted access. But could one possibly
form these beliefs through Bayesian updating, starting from uniform priors? The
answer is negative. After learning the truth of some proposition  the input of a
Bayesian update the agents degree of belief in some possibilities, namely those of
which the proposition is false, would have to be set to zero, and all other possibilities
would still have to be assigned credences proportional to the original priors; this is
a simple consequence of Bayess theorem. So it is never possible to assign posterior
degrees of belief 0.49, 0.3, 0.2 and 0.01 to four di¤erent basic possibilities (elements
of X) if the priors were 0.25, 0.25, 0.25 and 0.25.
There are only two ways in which we might arrive at these non-uniform poste-
riors via ordinary conditionalization. The rst is to apply Je¤rey conditionalization
as opposed to standard Bayesian conditionalization (see, e.g., Je¤rey 2004). In Jef-
frey conditionalization, the evidence or information learnt need not take the form
of a proposition, but can be a probability distribution. Thus the agent may begin
with uniform priors and then simply learn the required non-uniform probability dis-
tribution across the four di¤erent meeting points in Washington. In this case, the
evidential or informational input would be the probability distribution itself. It is
unclear, however, whether this qualies as an illuminating explanation of the agents
belief formation or just as a redescription of the facts that were to be explained in
the rst place.
The second way to remodel the agents belief formation using ordinary Bayesian
conditionalization is to deny that the set X correctly captures the underlying set of
possibilities, and to rene the space of possibilities, by splittingthe elements of X
into more ne-grained possibilities. Given the resulting more ne-grained space of
possibilities, it may then be possible for the agent to arrive at non-uniform credences
across di¤erent possible meeting points (such as 0.49, 0.3, 0.2 and 0.01) via ordinary
Bayesian updating from uniform priors (such as 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25). The individual
meeting points (Union Station, Lincoln Memorial etc.) would no longer be the most
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basic possibilities, but they would correspond to di¤erent non-singleton subsets of
a renement of the original set X. The input of a Bayesian update  namely a
proposition picking out a subset of that rened set of possibilities might then rule
out more possibilities underlying some meeting points (e.g., more nely individuated
possibilities that each correspond to meeting at Hilary Clintons apartment) than
possibilities underlying others (e.g., more nely individuated possibilities that each
correspond to meeting at Union Station). While this move is theoretically possible
and perhaps even plausible in some cases, it may require us to sacrice theoretical
parsimony by ascribing to the agent a very complex ontology of epistemic possibilities.
(This ination in the ascribed ontology of possibilities would be particularly signicant
in the case of repeated belief changes of the sort discussed here.) Addressing this issue
in detail is beyond the scope of this paper, but we wish to acknowledge it as something
that merits further attention.6
10 Concluding remarks
Just as standard rational choice theory does not say where an agents preferences
come from (see Dietrich and List 2012b), so Bayesian epistemology does not give a
satisfactory account of where the agents prior beliefs come from. We have tried to
sketch such an account, introducing a reason-based model of belief formation.
Our account provides many new conceptual resources, which we can only hint at
rather than fully develop here. Since our account can capture both the relationship
between positive doxastic reasons and an agents actual beliefs and the relationship
between normative doxastic reasons and the beliefs an agent ought rationally to have,
we are in a position to formalize notions such as:
 beliefs that are explained by positive doxastic reasons, but not justied by norma-
tive doxastic reasons: here, the agents positive doxastic reasons employed in his
or her belief formation are not genuine normative doxastic reasons, according
to our normative background theory of epistemology;
 beliefs that are justiable, but not actually justied, by the right reasons: here,
there exist some normative doxastic reasons that would justify the agents be-
liefs, given a suitable credibility relation or function, but these are not the
positive doxastic reasons actually employed by the agent in his or her belief
formation;
 beliefs that are formed on the basis of the right reasons versus the wrong ones:
here, the agents positive doxastic reasons are genuine normative doxastic rea-
sons (which still leaves open whether the agents credibility relation or function
is a normatively appropriate one);
6 In ongoing, unpublished work, we argue against the attempt to remodel reason-based attitude
formation in purely informational terms.
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 beliefs that are formed on the basis of the right credibility relation or function
versus the wrong one: here, the agents credibility relation or function is a
normatively appropriate one (which this still leaves open whether the agents
positive doxastic reasons are genuine normative ones);
 beliefs that are formed on the basis of the right reasons and the right credibility
relation or function: here, the agents actual belief formation coincides with the
normatively ideal one the epistemically impeccable case.
Similarly, our account points towards a novel taxonomy of di¤erent sources of
disagreement between two or more agents beliefs. Di¤erences in belief may stem
from:
 di¤erent doxastic reasons and di¤erent credibility relations or functions;
 di¤erent doxastic reasons but the same credibility relation or function;
 the same doxastic reasons but di¤erent credibility relations or functions;
 and, nally, di¤erences in evidence or information in the ordinary Bayesian
sense.
By providing these conceptual resources, our approach allows us to capture, among
other things, the role of reasons in one or several agentsdeliberation about their be-
liefs, over and above the familiar pooling of evidence or information. This is relevant,
for instance, to debates on Aumanns agreement theorem. Robert Aumann (1976)
famously proved that if di¤erent agents have the same prior beliefs and common
knowledge of one anothers rationality, they cannot agree to disagree. Our account
suggests that even if di¤erent agents have the same credibility function and common
knowledge of one anothers rationality, they may still agree to disagree, namely when
they have di¤erent doxastic reasons. This observation, in turn, raises some important
questions about how an agents doxastic reasons would be a¤ected by various kinds
of intra- and interpersonal deliberation.
Of course, the larger research programme of which the present paper is part
continues to be work in progress, but we hope to have illustrated the usefulness of a
reason-based approach to Bayesian epistemology.
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